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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems hold 
vacuously 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
Gödel’s Theorem XI essentially states that, if there is a P-formula [Con(P)] whose 
standard interpretation is equivalent to the assertion “P is consistent”, then [Con(P)] is 
not P-provable. We argue that there is no such formula. 
1.0 Introduction 
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem 
Theorem VI of Gödel’s seminal 1931 paper [Go31a], commonly referred to as “Gödel’s 
First Incompleteness Theorem”, essentially asserts: 
Meta-theorem 1: Every omega-consistent formal system P of Arithmetic contains a 
proposition "[(Ax)R(x, p)]” such that both "[(Ax)R(x, p)]” and "[~(Ax)R(x, p)]” are 
not P-provable. 
In an earlier paper [An02b], we argue, however, that a constructive interpretation of 
Gödel’s reasoning establishes that any formal system of Arithmetic is omega-
inconsistent. 
It follows from this that Gödel’s Theorem VI holds vacuously. 
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem 
In this paper, we now argue that Theorem XI of Gödel’s paper [Go31a], commonly 
referred to as “Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem”, also holds vacuously. 
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1.1 Notation 
We generally follow the notation of Gödel [Go31a]. However, we use the notation 
“(Ax)”, whose standard interpretation is “for all x”, to denote Gödel’s special symbolism 
for Generalisation.  
We use square brackets to indicate that the expression (including square brackets) only 
denotes the string1 named within the brackets. Thus, “[(Ax)]” is not part of the formal 
system P, and would be replaced by Gödel’s special symbolism for Generalisation in 
order to obtain the actual string in which it occurs. 
Following Gödel’s definitions of well-formed formulas2, we note that juxtaposing the 
string “[(Ax)]” and the formula3 “[F(x)]” is the formula “[(Ax)F(x)]”, juxtaposing the 
symbol “[~]” and the formula “[F]” is the formula “[~F]”, and juxtaposing the symbol 
“[v]” between the formulas “[F]” and “[G]” is the formula “[FvG]”. 
The numerical functions and relations in the following are defined explicitly by Gödel 
[Go31a]. The formulas are defined implicitly by his reasoning.  
1.2 Definitions 
We take P to be Gödel’s formal system, and define ([Go31a], Theorem VI, p24-25): 
(i)     "Q(x, y)" as Gödel’s recursive numerical relation "~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))". 
(ii)    "[R(x, y)]" as a formula that represents "Q(x, y)" in the formal system P. 
                                                        
1 We define a “string” as any concatenation of a finite set of the primitive symbols of the formal system 
under consideration. 
 
2 We note that all “well-formed formulas” of P are “strings” of P, but all “strings” of P are not “well-
formed formulas” of P. 
 
3 By “formula”, we shall mean a “well-formed formula” as defined by Gödel. 
 3
(The existence of such a formula follows from Gödel’s Theorem VII (1).) 
(iii)   "q" as the Gödel-number of the formula "[R(x, y)]" of P. 
(iv)   "p" as the Gödel-number of the formula "[(Ax)][R(x, y)]"4 of P. 
(v)    "[p]" as the numeral that represents the natural number "p" in P. 
(vi)   "r" as the Gödel-number of the formula "[R(x, p)]" of P. 
(vii)  "17Genr" as the Gödel-number of the formula "[(Ax)][R(x, p)]" of P. 
(viii) "Neg(17Genr)” as the Gödel-number of the formula "[~][(Ax)][R(x, p)]" of 
P. 
(ix)   "R(x, y)" as the arithmetical interpretation5 of the formula "[R(x, y)]" of P. 
(“R(x, y)” is defined by Gödel’s Theorem VII ([Go31a], p29), where it is 
proved equivalent to “Q(x, y)”.) 
(x)   "Wid(P)" as the number-theoretic assertion "(Ex)(Form(x) & ~Bew(x))". 
                                                        
 
4 We note that "[(Ax)][R(x, y)]" and "[(Ax)R(x, y)]" denote the same formula of P. 
 
5 We define “interpretation” as in Mendelson ([Me64], p49). We note that the interpreted arithmetic 
expression "F(x)" is obtained from the formula [F(x)] by replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of 
PA in the formula [F(x)] by an interpreted arithmetic symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation 
for some uniquely meaningful, intuitive, arithmetic concept). 
 
So the PA-formula [(Ax)F(x)] interprets as the arithmetic expression "(Ax)F(x)", and the PA-formula 
[~(Ax)F(x)] as the arithmetic expression "~(Ax)F(x)". 
 
We also note that, classically, the equivalent meta-assertions “[(Ax)F(x)] is a true proposition under the 
interpretation I of PA”, and "(Ax)F(x) is a true proposition of the interpretation I of PA”, are merely 
shorthand notations for the meta-assertion “F(x) is satisfied for any given value of x in the domain of 
the interpretation I of PA” ([Me64], p51). 
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("Wid(P)" is defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p36) as equivalent to the meta-
assertion “P is consistent”.) 
(xi)    "[Con(P)]" as the formula that represents " Wid(P)" in the formal system P. 
(xii)   "w" as the Gödel-number of the formula "[Con(P)]" of P ([Go31a], p37). 
(xiii)   "Con(P)" as the arithmetic interpretation of the formula "[Con(P)]" of P. 
1.3 Gödel’s semantic theses in Theorem XI 
We begin by noting some semantic theses that underlie Gödel’s proof of, and the 
conclusions he draws from, his Theorem XI ([Go31a], p36). 
Thesis 1: If a formula [F] is P-provable, then its standard interpretation “F” is a true 
arithmetic assertion. 
Thesis 2: “P is consistent”, abbreviated  “Wid(P)”, can be meaningfully defined as 
equivalent to the number-theoretic proposition “(Ex)(Form(x) & ~Bew(x))” 
([Go31a], p36, footnote 63). 
Thesis 3:  “Wid(P)” is equivalent to some arithmetic assertion "Con(P)", that is the 
interpretation of a P-formula "[Con(P)]". 
1.4 A meta-theorem 
We now argue that Gödel’s Thesis 3 is false. 
Meta-theorem 2: There is no P-formula that asserts, under interpretation, that P is 
consistent. 
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Proof: We assume that Gödel’s Thesis 3 is true, and there is some formula [Con(P)] of 
the formal system P such that, under the standard interpretation: 
"Con(P)" is a true arithmetical relation <==> P is a consistent formal system. 
We take this as equivalent to the assertion “[Con(P)] is a P-formula that asserts, under 
interpretation, that P is consistent”.  
(i)  By the definition of consistency6, [Con(P)] is P-provable if P is inconsistent - since 
every formula of an inconsistent P is a consequence of the Axioms and Rules of 
Inference of P7. 
(ii) Now, if [Con(P)] were P-provable then, by Thesis 1, we would conclude, under 
the standard interpretation, that: 
"Con(P)" is a true arithmetical assertion. 
We would further conclude, by Theses 2 and 3, the meta-assertion: 
P is a consistent formal system. 
However, this would be a false conclusion, since P may be inconsistent.  
(iii) It follows that we cannot conclude from the P-provability of [Con(P)] that P is 
consistent. Hence we cannot have any formula [Con(P)] such that: 
"Con(P)" is a true arithmetical assertion ==> "Wid(P)" is a true number-
theoretic assertion. 
                                                        
 
6 We take Mendelson’s Corollary 1.15 ([Me64], p37), as the classical definition of “consistency”. 
 
7 This follows from ([Me64], p37, Corollary 1.15). 
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(iv) We conclude that Gödel’s Thesis 3 is false, and there is no P-formula [Con(P)] 
such that: 
"Con(P)" is a true arithmetical relation <==> P is a consistent formal system. 
1.5 A meta-lemma 
From the above we may also conclude that8: 
Meta-lemma 1: Although a primitive recursive relation, and the interpretation of its 
formal representation, are always arithmetically equivalent, they are not always formally 
equivalent. 
1.6 Gödel’s Proof of Theorem XI 
The question arises: Does Meta-theorem 2 contradict Gödel’s Theorem XI [Go31a]?  
Now Gödel’s Theorem XI [Go31a] is essentially the following assertion. 
Meta-theorem 3: The consistency of P is not provable in P. 
Proof: Gödel [Go31a] argues that: 
(i) If P is assumed consistent, then the following number-theoretic assertions follow 
from his Theorems V, VI and his definition of “Wid(P)”. 
 Wid(P) => ~Bew(17Genr) 
 Wid(P) => (Ax)~xB(17Genr) 
                                                        
 
8 A possible cause, and significance, of such non-equivalence is discussed in ([An01], Chapter 2), and 
highlighted particularly in ([An01], Chapter 2, Section 2.9). 
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 17Genr = Sb(p 19|Z(p))) 
 Wid(P) => (Ax)~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) 
 Q(x, y) <=> ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))  
 (x)Q(x, y) <=> (Ax)~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))) 
 Wid(P) => (Ax)Q(x, p) 
(ii) Assuming that [(Ax)R(x, p)] asserts its own provability9, Gödel concludes from 
the above that the instantiation: 
wImp(17Genr), 
of the recursive number-theoretic relation “xImpy”, is a true numerical assertion. 
(iii) From this, he concludes that: 
“[Con(P)] => [(Ax)R(x, p)]” is P-provable. 
(iv) Now, in his Theorem VI, Gödel [Go31a] argues that, if P is assumed consistent, 
then [(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-provable. He thus concludes that, if P is assumed 
consistent, then [Con(P)] too is not P-provable. 
(v) Implicitly assuming that Thesis 3 is true, and so: 
"Con(P)" is a true arithmetical assertion <==> "Wid(P)" is a true number-
theoretic assertion, 
                                                        
 
9 We argue, in a companion paper, that this semantic assumption is a consequence of construing 
“(Ax)F(x)” non-constructively. It reflects the thesis that implicit Platonist assumptions underlie Gödel’s 
reasoning both in the proofs of, and the conclusions he draws from, various meta-propositions that he 
asserts as Theorems in [Go31a].  
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Gödel further concludes that (iv) is equivalent to asserting that the consistency of P 
is not provable in P. 
1.7 Conclusion 
However, since, by Meta-theorem 2, Gödel’s Thesis 3 is an invalid implicit assumption, 
we conclude that Gödel’s Theorem XI is essentially the vacuous meta-assertion: 
Meta-theorem 4: If there is a P-formula [Con(P)] whose standard interpretation is 
equivalent to the assertion “P is consistent”, then [Con(P)] is not P-provable. 
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